%0 Journal Article
%T Equilibrium in the symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest: Uniqueness and characterization
%A Ewerhart，Christian
%A Sun，Guang Zhen
%K Contests
%K Mixed-strategy equilibrium
%K Rent dissipation
%K Uniqueness
%X The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer contest admits a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium support is finite and includes the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.
%8 2018-05-28
%D 2018
%J Economics Letters
%P 51-54
%V 169
%@ 01651765
%U http://repository.um.edu.mo/handle/10692/20505
%W UM