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DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF A MAINTENANCE SERVICE CONTRACT
Zhaotong Lian1; Jinbiao Wu1,2
2013
Conference Name11th International Symposium on Operations Research and its Applications in Engineering, Technology and Management 2013 (ISORA 2013)
Source PublicationInternational Symposium on Operations Research and its Applications in Engineering, Technology and Management
Conference Date2013-8.23-25
Conference PlaceHuangshan, China
Abstract

This paper studies a novel maintenance model with service contracts. We use a non-cooperative game formulation in which both parties, agent and unit owner, take the decisions by maximizing their expected profits to determine the agent’s optimal pricing strategy, the length of warranty and the number of repairmen for a monopolist service agent providing the maintenance service. We find that the optimal length of warranty and the number of repairmen are independent of the warranty price functions. Furthermore, for fixed lifetime of the unit, the number of customers hardly affects the optimal length of warranty.

KeywordService Contract, Queueing System, Game Theory, Reliability, Optimization.
DOI10.1049/cp.2013.2267
Language英语
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Document TypeConference paper
专题DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Faculty of Business Administration
Affiliation1.Faculty of Business Administration, University of Macau
2.School of Mathematics and Statistics, Central South University
First Author AffilicationFaculty of Business Administration
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Zhaotong Lian,Jinbiao Wu. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF A MAINTENANCE SERVICE CONTRACT[C],2013.
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