UM  > 工商管理學院
Disincentives for Risk-Taking in Mortgage and Other Financial Markets: Adjusting Management Remunerations
Rose Neng Lai1; Robert Van Order2
2013-11
Conference NameAREUEA 2014 Meeting
Source PublicationProceedings of AREUEA 2014 Meeting
Conference Date9th and Friday 11th July 2014
Conference PlacePhiladelphia, USA
Abstract

Guaranteed Financial Institutions can structure portfolios with imbedded options to take on excessive risk without paying for it. This provides an incentive to take on higher risk. This paper proposes variants on Contingent Convertible (CoCo) bonds to be mandatorily included in the management remuneration package as a disincentive to taking higher risk. We show how the conversion ratios of the CoCo bonds can affect managers' appetite towards risk-taking and how incentives can be set up to have management make choices consistent with those made under efficient pricing.

KeywordFinancial Institutions Contingent Convertible Bonds Management Incentives Risk-taking Dodd-frank Act
Language英语
全文获取链接
Document TypeConference paper
专题Faculty of Business Administration
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND BUSINESS ECONOMICS
Affiliation1.University of Macau
2.George Washington University
First Author AffilicationUniversity of Macau
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rose Neng Lai,Robert Van Order. Disincentives for Risk-Taking in Mortgage and Other Financial Markets: Adjusting Management Remunerations[C],2013.
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
查看访问统计
导出为Endnote文件
Google Scholar
中相似的文章 Google Scholar
[Rose Neng Lai]的文章
[Robert Van Order]的文章
Baidu academic
中相似的文章 Baidu academic
[Rose Neng Lai]的文章
[Robert Van Order]的文章
Bing Scholar
中相似的文章 Bing Scholar
[Rose Neng Lai]的文章
[Robert Van Order]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
所有评论 (0)
暂无评论
 

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。