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Expert advising under checks and balances
Source PublicationSocial Choice and Welfare

This paper attempts to compare the efficiencies of different political institutions (with or without checks and balances) in extracting external "cheap talk" information. We find that a political institution with checks and balances can extract more credible information (measured by the number of signals) from an external partisan expert because no policymaker can unilaterally exploit revealed expert information to her own best advantage. However, there is a tradeoff between signal quantity and distribution under checks and balances, as more signals tend to be distributed more unevenly due to the existence of an "inertia region" where credible communication is more difficult. Institutions using checks and balances are more efficient when conflict of interest between policymakers is relatively small, in which case the signal distribution is less uneven. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

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Indexed BySCI
WOS Research AreaBusiness & Economics ; Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences
WOS SubjectEconomics ; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods
WOS IDWOS:000330992000011
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Document TypeJournal article
AffiliationDepartment of Government and Public AdministrationUniversity of Macau,Macao
First Author AffilicationUniversity of Macau
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GB/T 7714
Li,Tao. Expert advising under checks and balances[J]. Social Choice and Welfare,2019,42(2):477-502.
APA Li,Tao.(2019).Expert advising under checks and balances.Social Choice and Welfare,42(2),477-502.
MLA Li,Tao."Expert advising under checks and balances".Social Choice and Welfare 42.2(2019):477-502.
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