Organizational citizenship behavior in work groups: A team cultural perspective

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Summary

Although researchers have often found positive relationships between organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and performance rating, very few studies have scrutinized the team contexts in which such relationships exist. This study examines how OCB influences job performance ratings within different team cultures, as measured by team collectivism and individualism. On the basis of multilevel data collected from 81 teams working at a multinational bank in Hong Kong, team collectivism and individualism were found to moderate the OCB–performance rating relationship such that OCB targeting individuals improved rated performance in highly collectivistic teams only, whereas only organizational OCB produced a significant improvement in highly individualistic teams. The implications of these findings and directions for future research directions are discussed here. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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The original definition of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), according to Organ (1988), is “individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization” (p. 4). Organ (1997) later redefined OCB as “performance that supports the social and psychological environment in which task performance takes place” (p. 95). According to Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, and Blume (2009), the new definition of OCB offers several advantages over the original definition: it maintains the distinction between task performance and OCB, is consistent with the view of contextual performance (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993), and avoids the notion that OCB must be discretionary and has little to do with rewards. The new definition also highlights the importance of the context in which task performance takes place. Given this new definition, an understanding of OCB will be incomplete without taking into account the social and psychological environment.

Within the social and psychological environment in which task performance takes place, culture within groups and organizations plays a crucial role in shaping employee performance. According to O’Reilly and Chatman (1996), organizational or group culture is a powerful form of control which “can influence members’ focus of attention, shape interpretations of events, and guide attitudes and behavior” (p. 157). Team culture, defined as particular sets of values, norms, beliefs, and assumptions that are internalized, shared, and enacted by team members are of particular importance in shaping task performance for several reasons (Drach-Zahavy, 2004a; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996). First, individuals do not perform their tasks in isolation. Most employees need to coordinate with their team members to fulfill the task requirements. For instance, cross-functional teams are often used for new product development, in which talents from different functional areas are pulled together to facilitate innovativeness and creativity (Seth, Smith, & Park, 2001). Second, individuals need to be mindful of their team requirements and standards to perform their work effectively (van Knippenberg, 2000). Teams develop and enforce cultural norms to better predict team members’ behavior, especially if those norms are essential for the team’s survival.

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(Feldman, 1984). Third, Trushman and O’Reilly (1996) suggested that different teams may have different cultures that facilitate their effective functioning, so that team culture is an important part of the social environment that shapes individuals’ task performance (Hackman, 1992; Kidwell & Mossholder, 1997). Our focus on team culture is also motivated by the influence of culture on the boundary between in-role and extra-role behavior (Morrisson, 1994; Van Dyne, Graham, & Diener, 1994). Research indicates that because of cultural influences, managers may consider certain forms of OCB to be in-role behavior (e.g., Farh, Earley, & Lin, 1997). For instance, Lam, Hui, and Law (1999) showed that supervisors in Japan and Hong Kong, nations that are high on power distance, are more likely to consider courtesy as an in-role form of behavior. O’Reilly and Chatman (1996) also argued that organizational culture serves as a social control mechanism so that we believe team culture is likely to affect the in-role perceptions held by supervisors.

Following Organ’s (1997) revised definition of OCB, the purpose of our study is to examine the influence of team culture on OCB and its effect on job performance ratings. Specifically we draw on prior theoretical work of team culture in building hypotheses of this study (Levy & Williams, 2004; O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996; Van Dyne et al., 1994). Because team culture affects which types of individual behavior are considered to be normative and desirable, we reason that team culture may determine which types of OCB-related behavior managers expect as part of employees’ usual performance (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Thus employees’ job performance ratings will benefit if individuals conduct OCB-related behavior that is consistent with the team culture.

In developing our hypotheses, we focus on two aspects of OCB (Williams & Anderson, 1991): OCB that targets individuals (OCBI) and OCB that targets organizations (OCBO). This distinction is important because these two forms of OCB are associated with a distinct set of behaviors, antecedents, correlates, and consequences (Graham & Van Dyne, 2006; LePine & Van Dyne, 2001; Podsakoff et al., 2009). Because of these differences, Podsakoff et al. (2009) expected that OCBI and OCBO may have differential impact on job performance ratings and recommended future research to investigate that. Through an exploratory study, Organ and Paine (1999) also provided support for the notion that the distinction between OCBI and OCBO is particularly important for cross-cultural research. They found that individuals from different countries prioritized OCB toward coworkers and organizations differently, offering evidence that culture influences which forms of OCB are perceived as more important. According to Van Lange and Visser (1999), the social orientation of individuals, whether self-oriented or social-oriented, is crucial in understanding which forms of OCB employees will perform. Because team culture is likely to influence the social orientation of individuals, we focus on team collectivism and individualism in our study. Team collectivism is the extent to which team members share the perception that harmony and cooperation are important team values, and group interests should be placed above individual interests (Schaubroeck, Lam, & Cha, 2007). Team individualism on the other hand describes teams that embrace diversity and apply the unique skills of team members to challenging tasks (Man & Lam, 2003, p. 986). Recent work has suggested that individualism and collectivism can be considered as discrete dimensions at both the individual level (Triandis, 1995) and the organizational level (Robert & Wasti, 2002). We hypothesize that team collectivism and individualism will affect which aspect of OCB (OCBI or OCBO) will have a greater effect on job performance ratings.

This study makes two important contributions to the OCB literature. First, it adds to the multilevel perspective of OCB by examining how two team cultural contexts (collectivism and individualism) moderate the relationship between OCB and job performance ratings (Hofmann, 1997; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Although research on OCB has been extensive, the majority of this work has approached OCB as an individual-level phenomenon. Whereas some studies have begun to study OCB at the group level (e.g., Ehrhart & Naumann, 2004), very few studies have examined whether OCB has any cross-level effect (Bommer, Dierdorff, & Rubin, 2007). As OCB can be directed toward different levels (e.g., individual versus organization), it is important to adopt a multilevel approach in examining OCB (e.g., Organ & Ryan, 1995; Podsakoff et al., 2000). Schnake and Dumler (2003, p. 297), in particular, suggested that “what is critically needed to enhance our knowledge of OCB is cross-level research.” Our multilevel approach to examining the OCB–performance relationship is similar to the approach adopted by Bommer et al. (2007). Bommer and his coauthors found that in a team context in which OCB was...
rare, OCB was more strongly related to job performance ratings. Our study extends these findings by analyzing whether team culture affects which types of OCB are more influential on performance evaluation.

Second, this study improves our understanding regarding when to expect a strong relationship between OCB and job performance rating. The literature of performance appraisal suggests that evaluation of employee performance involves an interaction between the characteristics of the ratee and environmental factors (Ilgen & Favero, 1985). Therefore, appraisal context is critical in influencing how the appraisal process takes place (Levy & Williams, 2004). Prior literature also provides some evidence that the OCB–performance relationship is not universal and unequivocal (Eastman, 1994; Lovell et al., 2001; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Hui, 1993). Although Podsakoff et al. (2009) concluded in their meta-analysis that managers will consider OCB in their performance evaluation, they also noted that this conclusion is contrary to the findings reported by Bergeron (2007), who challenged the importance of OCB in affecting job performance ratings. Indeed, the meta-analysis by Podsakoff et al. (2009) revealed considerable variation in the reported correlations between OCB and job performance rating. Furthermore, the correlations could be inflated as some studies asked the same individual to report on both OCB and job performance.

When data on OCB and job performance ratings were obtained from different sources, Podsakoff et al. (2009) in their study found that the shared variance (8–13 percent) was four times lower than in studies in which the two ratings were obtained from the same source (36–48 percent). This finding suggests that there is still considerable unexplained variance in the OCB–performance relationship. The overall analysis indicates that moderators such as team culture could affect the strength of the relationship between OCB and job performance rating.

Collectivistic and Individualistic Team Cultures

Although cultures were originally conceived at the societal level (Hofstede, 1980), an increasing number of studies show that work teams also develop unique cultures (Levine & Moreland, 1991; Schaubroeck et al., 2007) when members share and enact a particular set of assumptions, beliefs, and values (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000). The notion that a team can have its own distinct culture has been advanced by a number of researchers (Alavi & McCormick, 2004; Drach-Zahavy, 2004a, 2004b; Earley & Mosakowski, 2004; Feldman, 1984). For instance, Drach-Zahavy (2004a) suggested that “the idea that teams can have a distinct culture is based on the assumption that particular sets of values, norms, beliefs, and assumptions become internalized, shared, and enacted by a team’s members” (p. 982). These values and norms facilitate team members to engage in behavior that is essential to the group’s survival (Feldman, 1984). Once a strong team culture is developed, the shared values and norms define what the team members consider to be right and wrong, and what constitutes acceptable behavior. In other words, team culture “offers a common sense of identity . . . and provides a basis for team member self-evaluation” (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000, p. 26). The attraction-selection-attrition process will further strengthen a team’s culture because applicants are likely to be drawn to work groups with similar values, whereas recruiters will look for individuals with a similar background and remove those that will not fit the company’s culture (Schneider, 1987). During socialization, newcomers also become familiar with the team culture through social interaction with more experienced team members.

Recent empirical research supports the importance of evaluating culture at the team level (e.g., Drach-Zahavy, 2004b; Gibson, 1999). Team cultural values such as power distance, individualism, and collectivism have been demonstrated to moderate how leadership, job design, and the procedural justice climate affect an employee’s attitude and performance (Man & Lam, 2003; Schaubroeck et al., 2007; Yang, Mossholder, & Peng, 2007). Man and Lam (2003), for example, found that compared with collectivistic teams, individualistic teams are more cohesive when they are provided with more complex jobs and autonomy, because they are likely to perceive opportunities to leverage their unique talents in solving challenging problems. Teams with strong cultures are also considered to be more cohesive, coordinated, and capable (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000).


**OCB in collectivistic teams**

Among the cultural differences identified by Hofstede (1980), individualism and collectivism have attracted the most attention in cross-cultural research (Brewer & Chen, 2007). They can explain significant value and norm differences in how individuals express their self-view and approach their social connections. As Schaubroeck et al. (2007, p. 1022) noted, a collectivistic team culture is “the extent to which members of a collective view the group’s needs and obligations as superordinate to individual needs and desires and the extent to which members wish to maintain strong, harmonious relationships with other group members.” The characteristics of a highly collectivistic team culture include stronger emphasis on “we” than “I,” such that cooperation and harmony serve as core team values. In other words, collectivistic teams place more priority on maintaining social and interpersonal relations than on satisfying individual interests. Behavior such as helping, caring, and giving support is common group norms in collectivistic teams. Man and Lam (2003) argued that collectivistic teams will even consider behavior that challenges team harmony as so negative that they would rather give up the opportunity to achieve a more ambitious goal.

OCBI, according to Williams and Anderson (1991), includes behavior that is directed toward the benefits of individuals, whereas OCBO refers to behavior that is directed toward the benefits of organizations. Podsakoff et al. (2009) further suggest that OCBI is mostly related to helping, which includes Organ’s (1988) description of altruism, courtesy, peacekeeping, and cheerleading. OCBI also reflects other OCB-related constructs such as interpersonal helping (Graham, 1989), interpersonal facilitation (Van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996), and interpersonal harmony (Farh et al., 1997). For these reasons, OCBI has been viewed as an interpersonal or personal form of OCB.

In contrast, OCBO refers to the impersonal form of OCB (Liu & Cohen, 2010; Organ, 1997; Organ & Paine, 1999). It captures Organ’s (1988) OCB dimensions of civic virtue, sportsmanship, and conscientiousness, and is mostly related to behavior such as demonstrating and sustaining “high standards for attendance, punctuality, conservation of organizational resources, and use of time while at work” (Organ, 1997, pp. 94–95) and “faithful adherence to rules about work procedures and conduct” (Organ & Ryan, 1995, p. 782). OCBO can thus be described by notions of obedience and functional participation by Van Dyne et al. (1994). Obedience is an individual’s willingness to comply with the organizational rules and regulations, whereas functional participation describes employee contributions that exceed the required standards. Unlike OCBI, these self-focused forms of behavior are not specifically targeted at certain individuals, but represent an impersonal contribution that promotes the overall functioning of the organization (Van Dyne et al., 1994).

Of the two forms of OCB, we propose that OCBI is more compatible with the collectivistic team culture. As collectivistic teams place stronger significance on social harmony, cooperation, and interpersonal relations, team members and supervisors will consider OCBI as desirable team behavior because of its emphasis on interpersonal helping and facilitation (Johnson, 2001; Podsakoff et al., 2009; Werner, 1994). In a highly collectivistic team, group norms such as cooperation, harmony, and interdependence are likely to be used by supervisors to construct the good employee prototype. Therefore, those who behave in concert with such group norms and prototypes are more likely to be placed by managers in “good” employee categories (Hogg, 2010). Performing OCBI is thus likely to be matched with the good employee prototype and rewarded with good performance evaluation. Second, there is also a good possibility that OCBI is considered an in-role form of behavior among teams that have a strong collectivistic culture (Organ, 1997; Van Dyne et al., 1994). The normative pressure to maintain group cohesiveness and cooperate with each other by interpersonal helping will be an ought-to-perform behavior in collectivistic teams. As discussed previously, the boundaries between in-role and extra-role behaviors are often fuzzy (e.g., Morrison, 1994) so that employees may not be clear of what the expected behaviors are. Using the social-information perspective, O’Reilly and Chatman (1996) argued that team culture, as a social learning and control mechanism, can focus team members’ attention on what to behave by mimicking the work behavior of their peers so as to avoid team disapproval. As members of collective teams are likely to engage in interpersonal helping, employees under such team context are likely to perceive OCBI as part of in-role behaviors they are expected to engage. Finally, OCBI contributes to an improvement in job performance ratings because of positive images of team citizens in these teams. Rather than
treat OCB as a discretionary form of behavior, Graham (1991) suggested that OCB should be considered a form of civic citizenship and includes behavior that organizational citizens ought to perform. For this reason, Van Dyne, Cummings, and McLean-Parks (1995) argued that workplace values such as team culture will affect which forms of OCB members should perform. Displaying OCBI in a collectivistic team is therefore normatively appropriate, and employees performing it are likely to be regarded as good citizens by their colleagues and supervisors (Hogg, 2010). Because OCBI is considered to be a form of in-role behavior in collectivistic teams and contributes to the image of good citizens, we suggest the following:

Hypothesis 1a: The positive relationship between OCBI and performance rating is stronger within a highly collectivistic team culture than within a less collectivistic team culture.

Unlike OCB, the self-focused and impersonal nature of OCBO is less congruent with the norms of a highly collectivistic team. As discussed previously, OCBO is regarded as an impersonal form of OCB which encompasses obedient behavior such as giving advance notice of absence and being punctual, but mostly refers to performing duties well beyond the standards required by the organization (e.g., Liu & Cohen, 2010; Organ, 1997; Organ & Paine, 1999; Ueda & Yoshimura, 2011). By exceeding organizational expectations, employees performing OCBO are also simultaneously demonstrating personal excellence. Thus some researchers consider OCBO as self-focused behavior (Van Dyne et al., 1994) that is driven by instrumental and career-related motives (Van Dyne et al., 1995). A review of the antecedents of OCBO also reveals that many of them are self-oriented in nature. For example, the Big Five personality dimension of conscientiousness, characterized by orderliness, dutifulness, achievement striving, and self-discipline, is consistently associated with the impersonal form of OCB, that is, OCBO (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). As OCBO appears to be self-oriented and is impersonal rather than interpersonal in nature, it is less compatible with the collectivistic team values emphasizing “we” and helping. Exhibiting OCBO in collectivistic teams is thus less likely to be considered prototypical and is less likely to be associated with good employee prototype by team members and supervisors. As a result, performance rating is less likely to be affected when an individual does not perform OCBO. Following this line of logic, we propose the following:

Hypothesis 1b: The positive relationship between OCBO and performance rating is weaker within a highly collectivistic team culture than within a less collectivistic team culture.

OCB in individualistic teams

A highly individualistic team culture is characterized by an emphasis on “I,” so that personal achievement, autonomy, uniqueness, and self-reliance are considered to be important team values (Drach-Zahavy, 2004a; Man & Lam, 2003). Individualistic team members focus on getting the job done rather than on maintaining social relations. Unlike collectivistic teams, in which members seek common interests, members of individualistic teams consider “diversity as a way of bringing unique qualities and multiple perspectives on problem solving to the situation” (Man & Lam, 2003, p. 986). In other words, individualistic teams embrace diversity by recognizing that members are individuals with different skills and perspectives. Individualists can be competitive and focus more on the advancement of personal gain, and Wagner and Moch (1986) suggested that individualists are likely to place personal interests above collective interests. Although they might also engage in OCB, their motives may involve impression management with the goal of enhancing career outcomes (Dávila & Finkelstein, 2011).

We propose that performing OCBO is more compatible with an individualistic team culture. As mentioned earlier, OCBO involves impersonal rather than interpersonal work behavior and efforts that are well beyond the standards required by the organization. It directly represents an individual’s conscientious effort to make personal contributions by completing his or her tasks diligently. Although OCBO immediately benefits the organization, such behavior is also congruent with values that benefit the individual, such as personal achievement and self-reliance. Under an
individualistic team environment, desirable behavior involves striving to achieve excellent personal performance by fulfilling one’s obligations or responsibilities. Because of the congruence with self-focused team values (Lavelle, 2010), employees who perform OCBO in individualistic teams are likely to be rewarded with good performance evaluation. As discussed previously, OCBO also involves behavior related to obedience and functional participation (Van Dyne et al., 1994). Individuals demonstrate obedience by respecting and abiding by rules, which helps the organization to achieve its goals. Functional participation describes individuals’ above-standard efforts and contributions, which are also conducive for organizational goal achievement.

In terms of categorization in the performance appraisal process, group norms such as independence, uniqueness, and personal achievement are likely to be used by supervisors to construct the good employee prototype in individualistic teams. As a result, employees engaging in OCBO are more likely to be placed in the good employee category, because their behavior is seen as supporting group norms (Hogg, 2010; Ilgen, Barnes-Farrell, & McKellin, 1993). As employees in the good category are likely to be appraised positively, we thus hypothesize the following:

**Hypothesis 2a:** The positive relationship between OCBO and performance rating is stronger within a highly individualistic team culture than within a less individualistic team culture.

In contrast, performing OCBI is more socially oriented (Lavelle, 2010) and does not support the self-oriented norm of an individualistic team culture. Individualistic teams are likely to place less emphasis on helping colleagues for group cohesiveness and maintaining social harmony, and will consider such behaviors to be discretionary rather than normative. In fact, self-oriented individuals may view helping others as a sign of incompetence among team members, and such behavior also comes at the expense of their own time and resources (Beunders, 2010). In other words, OCBI is less likely to be viewed as prototypical in-role behaviors in individualistic teams. As a consequence, supervisors will tend not to assign employees engaging in OCBI to the good employee category. Thus we posit the following:

**Hypothesis 2b:** The positive relationship between OCBI and performance rating is weaker in a highly individualistic team culture than in a less individualistic team culture.

### Method

**Sample**

Questionnaire data were collected of multiple teams of 403 customer service employees and 81 supervisors, employed by a multinational banking corporation in Hong Kong. There were a total of 81 teams with team size ranged from four to six members who directly reported to one supervisor. The mean age and tenure of team members were 25.3 years ($SD = 1.5$) and 3.9 years ($SD = 1.4$) respectively. Tenure of the members represents the number of years of service in the company. At the time data were collected, all participants had been working in their teams for more than one year. All of the participants were ethnic Chinese, and 87.3 percent were female. They had received 13.8 years ($SD = 1.1$) of education on average, which was equivalent to completion of high-school education in Hong Kong.

These respondents were drawn from two sections: customer service representatives from the financial services and personal banking section, and loan and other specialists from corporate banking section. Both customer service representatives and corporate banking specialists were of similar grades in the bank we studied, and all of them worked together as a team on a regular basis. They performed duties such as providing customer services in the corresponding areas and handling information-rich tasks that required a high level of information exchange, coordination, and interpersonal interaction among team members. The supervisors worked in close proximity with the team members and interacted with them on a daily basis; thus they had sufficient opportunity to observe the team members’ behaviors such as
OCBI and OCBO. In addition, because of the interdependence of work among team members, the team-based work environment of the sample in this study provided a meaningful platform for studying OCB in the team context.

Data collection procedure

Questionnaires, along with an introductory letter and an endorsement from senior management, were sent to potential participants through the company’s internal mail system. Respondents were guaranteed anonymity and provided with a stamped envelope pre-addressed directly to the researcher. The participants were asked to provide employee numbers on the survey so that their data could be matched with team data and with individual performance ratings provided by the supervisors. These procedures were done so that the researcher could not identify who the respondents were. All team members completed and returned their questionnaires in 81 of the 103 teams (a response rate of 78 percent). To check the representativeness of the sample, data from the respondents were compared with company data on the total employee population of first-line workers. There were no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents in the sampling frame in terms of age, gender, education, or company tenure in terms of years of service.

Measures

The original questionnaire was prepared in English. However, because the native language of almost all Hong Kong residents is Chinese, the scales were translated into Chinese by using the standard back-translation procedure (Brislin, 1980). The translated version was pre-tested with 30 employees belonging to the same organization. They were asked to comment on any item that they found ambiguous. This process did not result in major changes to any of the items. All question responses were anchored to a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).

Organizational citizenship behavior

OCBI and OCBO were measured by a 12-item scale developed by Williams and Anderson (1991), with six items for each construct. Supervisors from each team were asked to rate their subordinates’ levels of OCBI and OCBO on a 5-point Likert-type scale ($\alpha = .93$ for both OCBI and OCBO) based on their behaviors in the last 12 months. Higher scores indicated higher levels of OCB.

To examine whether OCBI and OCBO were distinct constructs, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using AMOS 5 maximum likelihood estimation to compare the fit indices of a one-factor model with a two-factor model. CFA results show that the two-factor structure ($\chi^2 = 165.16; df = 53; \chi^2/df$ ratio = 3.12; adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) = 0.91; $CFI = 0.97; RMSEA = 0.07$) has a superior fit over the one-factor model ($\chi^2 = 1884.66; df = 54; \chi^2/df$ ratio = 34.90; $AGFI = 0.20; CFI = 0.51; RMSEA = 0.29$). Therefore, we conclude that team supervisors were able to distinguish between OCBI and OCBO.

Team collectivism and team individualism

When measuring team collectivism and individualism, we asked respondents to rate items with the team’s rather than the members’ own orientations (cf. Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Eby & Dobbins, 1997). Doing so allowed us to capture shared perception among team members, a defining characteristic of team culture. We adapted 12 items from Robert and Wasti’s (2002) scale to measure team individualism and team collectivism by asking respondents to indicate how well the items described their teams in general (i.e., the referent is the team rather than the individual). A sample team individualism item is “In this unit, each worker is encouraged to realize his or her own unique potential” ($\alpha = .96$), and a sample team collectivism item is “In this unit, regardless of hierarchical level, employees take each other’s views into consideration” ($\alpha = .93$). Within each group, responses to this scale were aggregated to represent the team-level measure.

Both team individualism and team collectivism are group-level measures (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Empirically, within-group agreement had to be established to justify the aggregation of group-level measures. To assess the within-group agreement, we computed the within-group inter-rater reliability (r_{wg}) by using the method developed by James, Demaree, and Wolf (1984, 1993). We calculated the mean r_{wg} of team collectivism across 81 teams to be .98, ranging from .95 to .99; and the mean r_{wg} of team individualism to be .97, ranging from .80 to .99, indicating a high level of within-group agreement across teams.

Next, two intra-class correlations, ICC(1) and ICC(2), were computed to evaluate the group-level properties of data (James, 1982). One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compute the intra-class correlation coefficient. The results show that all values of ICC(1) and ICC(2) for team individualism and team collectivism met with the recommended norms. For team individualism, ICC(1) is 0.82 and ICC(2) are 0.96, whereas ICC(1) and ICC(2) for team collectivism are 0.74 and 0.93, respectively. Assessing these results, we concluded that the use of aggregate measures of team individualism and team collectivism was tenable.

We performed two CFAs to verify that team individualism and team collectivism are distinct. We performed the first CFA at the individual level (n=403 employees) by comparing two models treating individualism and collectivism as separate or single construct. The two-factor model shows better fit (χ^2 = 72.24.; df = 53; χ^2/df ratio = 1.36; AGFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.03) than the one-factor model (χ^2 = 864.67; df = 54; χ^2/df ratio = 16.01; AGFI = 0.43; CFI = 0.82; RMSEA = 0.19), suggesting that respondents were able to differentiate the two constructs. Next, we performed another CFA at the team level (n=81 teams). The fit indices also show that the two-factor structure (χ^2 = 68.87; df = 53; χ^2/df ratio = 1.30; AGFI = 0.82; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.06) has a better fit than the one-factor model (χ^2 = 487.26; df = 54; χ^2/df ratio = 9.02; AGFI = 0.10; CFI = 0.77; RMSEA = 0.32). These are evidence that we can treat team individualism and team collectivism as two distinct constructs.

Performance rating
Employee performance ratings were obtained from the organization’s annual performance appraisal report at the same time that this survey was conducted. The period covered in the performance appraisal (i.e., 12 months) was the same as one in which OCBI and OCBO were rated. The appraisal report was independent of this study and rated employees’ job performances on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from very poor (1) to very good (5). Other studies (e.g., Shore, Barksdale, & Shore, 1995) also used a similar approach in determining performance appraisal ratings.

Control variables
Numerous studies have consistently found conscientiousness to have a positive relationship with employee performance, because conscientious individuals tend to take their work more seriously and thus will devote more efforts toward better job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hochwater, Witt, & Kacmar, 2000; Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). Therefore, we controlled for conscientiousness in all statistical analyses. Conscientiousness was measured by a 10-item scale developed by Goldberg (1999) (α = .93). In addition, we also controlled for tenure, which might have confounding effects on performance evaluation ratings.

Data analysis
In testing the hypotheses involving both individual and team-level data, we conducted hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to determine whether significant between-group variance existed in the performance ratings. Given that there are level 2 predictors in this study, HLM has been said to be a more appropriate analytical tool than ordinary least square model because of its ability to simultaneously account for level 1 and level 2 variances (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). Following the suggestions by Hofmann (1997), we ran slope-as-outcome models by treating the relationship between OCB and performance rating as dependent variable in the level 2 equations. Specifically we first entered the control variables and then added OCBI and OCBO as level 1 predictors of individual’s performance ratings. We then entered team collectivism and team individualism as level 2 variables to explain variance of performance ratings.
(i.e., intercept of level 1 model) and the relationships between OCB and performance ratings (i.e., slopes of level 1 model). According to the guidelines suggested by Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, and Congdon (2000), all level 1 variables were group mean-centered.

### Results

Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all variables in the analyses. As expected, both OCBI and OCBO were significantly correlated with performance rating ($r = .26$ and $.25, p < .05$). Conscientiousness was also significantly related to performance rating ($r = .10, p < .05$).

Results of HLM are reported in Table 2. As indicated by Model 2, both OCBI and OCBO were significantly related to employees’ performance ratings ($\gamma = 0.29$ and 0.20, $p < .001$ and <.01, respectively). Further analyses revealed there is significant variance in the slope terms between OCBO and performance ratings [$\chi^2(70) = 105.49, p < .005$] and between OCBI and performance ratings [$\chi^2(70) = 97.63, p < .05$]. According to Hofmann (1997), these are evidence that there remains significant variance to be explained on the level 1 slope terms so that further analyses of cross-level interactions are warranted.

With this evidence, we proceeded to analyses of our moderation hypotheses. Hypothesis 1a predicted that the relationship between OCBI and performance rating would be stronger in a highly collectivistic team culture than in a less collectivistic team culture. As shown in Model 3, the results suggest that team collectivism positively and significantly moderated the relationship between OCBI and performance rating ($\gamma = 0.53, p < .001$). From these results, we calculated that the level 2 interaction term explained an additional level 2 variance of 60.82 percent. Further examination of the relationships by plotting the interaction effects following Aiken and West’s (1991) procedures. The pattern in Figure 1 indicates that the positive relationship between OCBI and performance appraisal rating was stronger in teams with highly collectivistic values than in those with less collectivistic values. These results support Hypothesis 1a.

In Hypothesis 1b, we also predicted that the relationship between OCBO and performance rating would be weaker within a highly collectivistic team culture than within a less collectivistic team culture. Our analyses indicate that team collectivism negatively and significantly moderated the relationship between OCBO and performance ($\gamma = -0.38, p < .001$; Model 6 of Table 2). The level 2 interaction term also accounted for an additional 38.45 percent of level 2 variance. Further examination of the interaction effects indicates that the positive relationship between OCBO and performance rating was indeed weaker in highly collectivistic teams than in less collectivistic teams (Figure 2). These results provided support for Hypothesis 1b.

### Table 1. Descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and correlations among variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$SD$</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tenure</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Conscientiousness</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>—05</td>
<td>(.93)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. OCBI</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>(.93)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. OCBO</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>—01</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Team individualism</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>—01</td>
<td>—02</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Team collectivism</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>(93)</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$N = 403$. Cronbach’s alphas appear on the diagonal for multiple-item measures.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

Table 2. Hierarchical linear modeling results for subordinates' rated performance (OCBI and OCBO).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intercepts and variables</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.83***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>3.83***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>3.83***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level 1 control variables</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscientiousness</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 independent variable</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCBI</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.28***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCBO</td>
<td>0.20**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 independent variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team collectivism</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team individualism</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction term</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCBI × Team collectivism</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCBI × Team individualism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.20**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCBO × Team individualism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCBO × Team collectivism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change in variance (level 1)</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>44.83</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change in variance (level 2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60.82</td>
<td>29.05</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>38.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05;  
**p < .01;  
***p < .001, two-tailed test.
Regarding individualistic team culture, Model 5 of Table 2 shows that team individualism positively moderated the relationship between OCBO and performance rating (γ = 0.29, p < .001) with an additional 42.68 percent of level 2 variance explained by the level 2 interaction term. Figure 3 further confirms that the positive effect of OCBO on performance rating is stronger within a more individualistic team culture. Therefore, Hypothesis 2a was supported.

Figure 1. Interaction between OCBI and team collectivism on performance rating

Figure 2. Interaction between OCBO and team collectivism on performance rating

Figure 3. Interaction between OCBO and team individualism on performance rating
Finally, Hypothesis 2b predicted that the relationship between OCBI and performance rating would be weaker within a highly individualistic team culture than in a less individualistic team culture. The results in Model 4 of Table 2 indicate that the moderating effect of team collectivism on the OCBI–performance relationship was negative and significant ($\gamma = -0.20, p < .01$) with the level 2 interaction term explaining an additional 29.05 percent of the level 2 variance. Figure 4 further shows that the positive effect of OCBI on performance rating was weaker within a highly individualistic team culture than within a less individualistic team culture. Thus Hypothesis 2b was also supported.

In assessing the robustness of our results, we ran additional HLM models without the control variables. These analyses show that the results were virtually identical in terms of the size, direction, and significance of the gamma coefficients of the interaction terms of Models 3 to 6, thus providing additional support for our hypotheses.

**Discussion**

To determine when OCB has the most influence, we proposed that team culture plays a key moderating role in the OCB–performance relationship. Our analyses support the idea that team cultures, specifically the degree to which they are individualistic or collectivistic, influence the emphasis that supervisors place on OCBI and OCBO in evaluating employees. Teams with highly collectivistic cultures place more value on interpersonal relationships, workplace harmony, and peer support. Thus the interpersonal nature of OCBI behavior is more likely to fit the norms of a highly collectivistic team and to be considered as good citizenship behaviors. Our findings show that in highly collectivistic teams, OCBI mattered more in job performance ratings. Engaging in OCBO, however, did not result in similar improvement in performance ratings, because OCBO was less likely to be seen as directly supporting group norms.

On the other hand, in highly individualistic teams, OCBO rather than OCBI is more likely to improve rated performance. Individualistic teams emphasize OCBO because such extra-role behavior is consistent with the norms of personal achievement, independence, and uniqueness. Our analyses show that OCBO was more positively associated with job performance ratings in highly individualistic teams. As personal relationships matter less in individualistic teams, we reason that OCBI is less likely to be seen as in-role behavior or associated with the good citizen category. Our findings show that the positive relationship between OCBI and performance ratings was weaker in highly individualistic teams.

The primary goal of this study is to gain additional understanding of the team cultural and performance appraisal process regarding when and why OCB contributes to improvement in job performance ratings. By examining the influence of team culture as social control mechanism and the specific forms of OCB in analyzing the OCB–performance relationship.
relationship, our study complements the current body of OCB and performance appraisal literature in several ways. Our first contribution is to offer a multilevel perspective in understanding the OCB–performance relationship. Although findings from meta-analysis show that OCB in general will lead to better job performance ratings (Podsakoff et al., 2009), there is also considerable variation and unexplained variance in this relationship. Consistent with prior theoretical work of team culture (e.g., O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996; Van Dyne et al., 1994), our findings suggest that the variation is due to team-level influences. By considering the impact of team collectivism and individualism, we extend the performance appraisal literature regarding the influence of team context, an important area that receives relatively little attention from prior literature (Levy & Williams, 2004). We also show that, consistent with Organ’s (1997) modified definition of OCB, the social environment in which employees perform their work roles is an important context in influencing when employees will perform OCB, and how supervisors will evaluate their behaviors (DeNisi, 2000; Ilgen & Favero, 1985; Judge & Ferris, 1993; Levy & Williams, 2004). Our findings also echo with O’Reilly and Chatman’s (1996) discussion on culture as social control. They argue that individuals complying with group norms are evaluated positively, whereas violation of group norms is considered disloyal and results in sanction and exclusion. Our findings support this argument by demonstrating that the right match between the form of OCB and team culture is important in performance evaluation decisions. After all, performance appraisal system should be designed in a way to encourage behaviors that support the organizational or team culture (Levy & Williams, 2004). Moreover, this study contributes to the understanding of how supervisors construct the good employee prototype in performance appraisal. Our results show that supervisors might take cues from the team culture in forming the prototype of good employees.

Next, our analyses point to the importance of distinguishing the forms of OCB when examining their impact on performance evaluation. One future research suggestion offered by Podsakoff et al. (2009) was to examine the differential impact of OCBI and OCBO on job performance ratings. Although their meta-analysis shows that OCBO in general has a larger impact on job performance ratings than OCBI, they concluded that more research is needed to examine “the effects of the target of OCBS on the nature of the relationships between the antecedents and consequences of these behaviors” (p. 133). As OCBI and OCBO differ in their targets and nature (Podsakoff et al., 2009; Williams & Anderson, 1991), we reason that their impact on job performance ratings should also vary. Our analyses support the notion that OCBI is more affiliative with the purpose of promoting interpersonal relationships and harmony, whereas OCBO is more impersonal and self-oriented in nature (Lavelle, 2010; Van Dyne et al., 1995). By studying the specific forms of OCB, we also gain additional understanding of why OCB will lead to improvement in job performance ratings.

Finally, we provide supporting evidence that team cultural norms affect the definition of in-role behavior. Prior research has suggested that supervisor and employee definitions of in-role behavior are not always consistent, and perceptions of OCB vary across situations (Graham, 1991; Morrison, 1994; Van Dyne et al., 1994). However, studies on the boundary between in-role and extra-role behavior are rather limited in number (Farh, Zhong, & Organ, 2004; Lam et al., 1999). Our findings show that OCB is more likely to be seen as in-role behavior when it is consistent with group norms. Ehrhart and Naumann (2004) recently developed a conceptual model demonstrating how a group develops certain norms regarding the nature of “correct” OCB. We provide some evidence that the correct forms of OCB are the result of a team’s individualistic or collectivistic culture.

Limitations and directions for future research

Despite our significant findings, this study has several limitations. First, it was a cross-sectional study, and causal inferences on the OCB–performance rating relationship simply could not be made confidently. In addition, on the basis of the current study design and the lack of direct assessment of in-role definitions among supervisors, we cannot definitively attribute the observed relationships either to supervisor perceptions in performance evaluation or to actual employee performance. It is possible that when employees conform to team norms, they are also more likely to be accepted by and receive support from team members who help straighten things out and thus genuinely
perform better on the job (Behrman & Perreault, 1982; Heneman, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 1993). Future studies should therefore consider using objective performance when assessing the impact of OCB.

Another limitation is the one-item measure of performance rating in this study. Although the performance rating was obtained from the company’s record, single-item scales often suffer from a lack of internal reliability and an inability to represent the multi-dimensional nature of the construct. However, Wanous, Reichers, and Hudy (1997) argued that the use of a single-item measure is sufficient when the construct being measured is unambiguous in regard to the respondent. For example, a single-item measure of overall job satisfaction would be more valid than a scale assessing job facet satisfaction (Scarpello & Campbell, 1983).

The third limitation concerns the correlated method variance of the OCB scale. In the current study, the same supervisor rated his or her subordinates’ OCB by using the same scale, at the same point in time. This approach might inflate the observed relationships. To eliminate this problem, future research should adopt LePine, Erez, and Johnson’s (2002) suggestion of using ratings from more than one source when measuring OCB. For example, peers are more appropriate judges of OCBI, whereas supervisors are better judges of OCBO and task performance. However, this study incorporated matched-sample data from subordinates and supervisors, and data on performance ratings were collected at different points in time and from different sources. Therefore, the study design minimized the likelihood of common method variance. Indeed the reported correlation between OCBS and job performance in our study is consistent with the results of the meta-analysis of Podsakoff et al. (2009) when data of OCB and job performance ratings are obtained from different sources.

Our findings are consistent with the proposition that the boundary of in-role and extra-role behavior is fuzzy rather than definite (Morrison, 1994; Van Dyne et al., 1994). We suggest that extra-role behavior that conforms to team cultural norms is more likely to be considered in-role behavior. Future research can therefore analyze whether OCBI and OCBO items are perceived to be in-role behavior with collectivistic and individualistic teams and whether such perceptions differ between supervisors and subordinates (Lam et al., 1999). Indeed, research on prototypical processing also offers similar suggestion (e.g., Foti & Lord, 1987; Ilgen et al., 1993). Prior studies have shown how OCB influences supervisors’ decision in performance ratings with respect to their implicit performance standards (Allen & Rush, 1998; MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Fetter, 1991; Podsakoff et al., 1993). According to these studies, supervisors form prototypes of what a good employee should be and compare their subordinates with these prototypes during performance evaluation. Those subordinates who perform OCB will usually receive better evaluation because they are matched with the “good employee” prototype and placed into the “good employee” category. Following this line of research, we reason that team cultural norms can affect how supervisors cognitively construct the good employee prototype in our study (Hogg, 2010). Those who behave in concert with group norms/prototypes are more likely to be placed by managers in “good” employee categories, and those who deviate from group norms are assigned to “bad” employee categories. As we did not have any measure of employee prototype in this study, future research can analyze the relationship between team cultural norms and supervisors’ assignment of good and bad employee categories in enhancing our understanding if certain OCB forms are part of supervisors’ in-role perceptions (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Lam et al., 1999). Our results illustrate the significance of team culture within the performance evaluation process. Moreover, prior research has shown that strength of organizational culture and climate, defined as dispersion of shared perception of certain beliefs and values among team members, to be useful in understanding how organizational culture affects individuals’ behaviors (Chan, 1998). Indeed, the normative pressure of team culture on OCB can be expected to be influenced by how strong the team culture is (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1996). We thus expect strength of team collectivism and individualism to be an important construct in improving our knowledge of team cultural influence on employee’s engagement of OCB. Future studies exploring other team contextual moderators will also deepen our understanding of OCB in relation to performance appraisals. For instance, team efficacy, defined as team members’ belief and confidence that other team members can perform their tasks successfully (Chan, 1998), would be an important team characteristic in the analysis of individualistic team culture. Under low team efficacy, individuals have little confidence that their team members can perform their work effectively. Team individualism, on the other hand, assumes that team members are seen by others as capable individuals so that teams will embrace diversity and accept challenging goals. Future research thus can consider team efficacy when studying the normative pressure of team individualism on
OCB. In addition, we predict that impression-management culture might be one of the moderators to be considered in the future. Bolino, Varela, Bande, and Turnley (2006) summarized three forms of impression-management tactics: supervisor-focused, self-focused, and job-focused tactics. In particular, employees who engage in self-focused tactics strive to project the image of a diligent role model. They tend to work harder and with more dedication when others are watching. A team culture that promotes these self-focused strategies might thus place more importance on OCBO, which encompasses personal dedication. Thus it will be instrumental to capture the motives of OCB in future research in order to differentiate whether the OCB is altruistic or self-focused. Although Bolino et al. (2006) did not find any significant relationship between self-focused impression management and OCB, which was measured as a uni-dimensional construct, future research is still needed to better understand the relationship by using OCBI and OCBO. Moreover, because impression-management tactics are often directed at supervisors, coworkers’ perspectives toward the “actors” are likely to differ from those of supervisors (Wayne, Kacmar, & Ferris, 1995). As a result, it is imperative for future studies that investigate impression management as a potential moderator to use multiple raters in measuring OCB (Vandenberg, Lance, & Taylor, 2005).

References


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   Strikethrough a red line through text that is to be deleted.
   **How to use it**
   - Highlight a word or sentence.
   - Click on the Strikethrough (Del) icon in the Annotations section.

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   Highlights text in yellow and opens up a text box where comments can be entered.
   **How to use it**
   - Highlight the relevant section of text.
   - Click on the Add note to text icon in the Annotations section.
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4. Add sticky note Tool – for making notes at specific points in the text.
   Marks a point in the proof where a comment needs to be highlighted.
   **How to use it**
   - Click on the Add sticky note icon in the Annotations section.
   - Click at the point in the proof where the comment should be inserted.
   - Type the comment into the yellow box that appears.
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- Click on the proof to where you’d like the attached file to be linked.
- Select the file to be attached from your computer or network.
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